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IN THE UTAH COURT OF \PPEALS

S I M I Ol UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

v.

:

TREN SHELDON HORR «

:

Defendant S|• |M Hint.

( us. \<i >lllli.in,N < \

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDMTION VM) N S II KFOI l'KO( I I IHNCS
This is an appeal from two convictions for criminal non-support, both third degree
felonies, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-201 (West 2004). This Court has
ji.i LSdi.ti.):; ui me appeal under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Did the trial court properly exercise its discretion s

" that defendant

failed to show that a state-paid accountant was "necessary for an effective delense"
mhhi I i wH <ihi Vixi-i i) n-1 P HI'MH^i >l '"II 11 '
Standard of review. A trial court's disposition of a defendant's request for a statepaid expert is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g, Alverson v. State, 983 P.2d
498, 511 n. 34 (Okla. App. 1999); Commonwealth v. Serge, 896 A.2d 1170, 1184-1185
!Vnr. "''iMM. cert, denied, 111 S.Ct. 275 [Oct 2, 2006); State v. Anderson, 655 P.2d
1196, 1198 (Wash. App. 1982). Cf. State v. Hancock, 874 P.2d 132, 135 (Utah App.

1994) (reviewing trial court's disposition of request for a state-paid investigator for abuse
of discretion (citing State v. Cabututan, 861 P.2d 408, 411-12 (Utah 1993)).
2. Did the trial court properly exercise its discretion to deny defendant's
motion to sever two charges of criminal non-support?
Standard of review. A trial court's denial of a motion to sever charges is reviewed
for an abuse of discretion. State v. Mead, 2001 UT 58, ^ 59, 27 P.3d 1115. "'A denial of
severance will only be reversed [on appeal] if it is affirmatively shown that a defendant's
right to a fair trial has been impaired."' Id. at ^f 54 (quoting State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d
440, 445 (Utah 1986)).
3, Should this Court review defendant's inadequately briefed claim that the
trial court committed plain error in not sua sponte recusing itself for alleged bias?
Defendant raises this unpreserved claim under the plain error doctrine. Aplt. Br. at
1,10. To show plain error, defendant must show "that the trial court committed an error
that was both obvious and prejudicial." State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45, \ 24, 122 P.3d 543.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-7-201 (West 2004):

(1) A person commits criminal nonsupport if, having a spouse, a child, or
children under the age of 18 years, he knowingly fails to provide for the
support of the spouse, child, or children when any one of them:
(a) is in needy circumstances; or
(b) would be in needy circumstances but for support received from a
source other than the defendant or paid on the defendant's behalf.
2

(2) Except as provided in Subsection (3), criminal nonsupport is a class A
misdemeanor.
(3) Criminal nonsupport is a felony of the third degree if the actor:
(a) has been convicted one or more times of nonsupport, whether in
this state, any other state, or any court of the United States;
(b) committed the offense while residing outside of Utah; or
(c) commits the crime of nonsupport in each of 18 individual months
within any 24-month period, or the total arrearage is in excess of $10,000.
(4) For purposes of this section "child" includes a child born out of
wedlock whose paternity has been admitted by the actor or has been
established in a civil suit.
(5)(a) In a prosecution for criminal nonsupport under this section, it is an
affirmative defense that the accused is unable to provide support.
Voluntary unemployment or underemployment by the defendant does not
give rise to that defense. . . .
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 77-8a-l (West 2004):

(1) Two or more felonies, misdemeanors, or both, may be charged in the
same indictment or information if each offense is a separate count and if the
offenses charged are:
(a) based on the same conduct or are otherwise connected together in
their commission; or
(b) alleged to have been part of a common scheme or plan.

(4) (a) If the court finds a defendant or the prosecution is prejudiced by
joinder of offenses or defendants in an indictment or information or by a
joinder for trial together, the court shall order an election of separate trials
of separate counts, grant a severance of defendants, or provide other relief
as justice requires. . . .

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Charge. Defendant was charged with two counts of criminal non-support, both
third degree felonies, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-201 (West 2004). R10704.
Conviction. Following a two-day jury trial, defendant was convicted as charged.
R340.
Sentence. On 22 August 2006, the trial court imposed two consecutive prison
terms of zero to five years. R381. The trial court suspended the statutory prison terms
and placed defendant on a ten-year term of probation, including 120 days jail. R380. The
trial court also ordered defendant to pay restitution in the amount of $53,017.40, and to
pay on-going child support in the amount of $457 per month. Id.
Notice of appeal. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal on 22 August 2006.
R391.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Defendant had two children with his first wife, Teresa Warden: Jillyn Eugenia,
born 4 May 1987, and Kelsey Maureen, born 23 September 1988. R106; R426:203.
Defendant and Teresa divorced in May 1990. Id. at 203. Defendant was ordered to pay
child support. Id. at 204, 209, 210. Teresa received defendant's payments through the
Office of Recovery Services (ORS). Id. at 210, 257. Defendant did not make any
payments to Teresa that were not reported to ORS. Id. at 214. Defendant did not help
Teresa with birthdays or holidays and told Teresa that she would "never see any money."
4

Id. at 214-15. According to ORS, defendant owed Teresa $16,850 for the seven-year
period between August 1997 and July 2004, but ORS had collected only $4,403,98. Id. at
257-58.
Defendant had two children with his second wife, Maria Louise Pincock: Ashley
Louise, born 10 July 1991 (deceased 6 July 2000), and Allie Brianne, born 12 January
1996. R106; R426:177. Defendant and Maria divorced in September 1994, subsequently
remarried, and divorced again in May 1998. Id. at 178. Defendant was ordered to pay
child support. Id. at 178, 252-53. Maria reported any child support payments that she
received directly from defendant to ORS. Id. at 183. Defendant did not make direct
payments to Maria "on a regular basis." Id. at 191. Defendant did not help Maria with
birthdays or holidays and he was "defiant" whenever Maria requested assistance. Id. at
183-84. Defendant told Maria that if she "didn't get [ORS] to quit garnishing his wages
he would quit his job so they couldn't garnish wages," and that he "spend[s] a hell of a lot
of money making sure [she doesn't] know how much money [he] [has]." Id. at 184.
According to ORS records, defendant owed Maria $28,721 in child support for the
approximate six-year period between October 1998 and June 2004, but had only paid her
$9,099.21. M a t 254. Of this money, only $2,426.13 was paid voluntarily. Id. A
voluntary payment is a payment made through voluntary income withholding or
personally by the defendant. Id.

5

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Point I. To qualify for state-paid expert assistance, a defendant must show both
that he is indigent and that the expert assistance is necessary to an effective presentation
of his defense. While there is no dispute here that defendant was indigent, his cursory
claims on appeal are inadequate to demonstrate that a state-paid expert was necessary to
his defense. Even if defendant's claims are deemed adequately briefed, however, they
lack merit. Defendant claimed below that a state-paid accountant was necessary because
he had several theories and amortization tables he wished to present to the jury. But
defendant never identified his alleged theories to the trial court. Defendant also claimed
that the payment summaries prepared by the State were inaccurate, but he never identified
any alleged errors in the State's calculations of his arrearages. Given defendant's
undeveloped assertions of error, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
defendant's request for a state-paid accountant. The trial court properly found that the
type of record keeping defendant described did not require the skills of an accountant;
thus, it was not necessary to his defense. This sound ruling should be upheld.
Point II. The trial court properly exercised its discretion to deny defendant's
motion to sever the charges of criminal non-support. The two charges were properly
joined, first, because they were connected together in their commission. The time periods
overlapped by a period of six years and the amount of the child support obligation in one
case was thus relevant to defendant's ability to pay in the other case. The charges were
also properly joined because they were alleged to have been part of a common scheme or
6

plan to avoid making any child support payments. The trial evidence was not to the
contrary. The State introduced evidence that defendant made statements to both his
former wives that they would not get any money from him or that he was avoiding having
to pay child support. Finally, defendant suffered no unfair prejudice from the joinder
because the evidence of non-support was mutually admissible in separate trials. As
noted, one child support obligation was relevant to determining the amount of the other.
Further, the evidence of non-support was probative of defendant's disputed motive, intent
and plan to avoid making any child support payments. The trial court's ruling denying
the severance motion should thus be upheld.
Point III. Defendant's claim that the trial court plainly erred in not sua sponte
recusing itself for bias is inadequately briefed. To prevail under the plain error doctrine,
defendant has to show obvious and prejudicial error. Although defendant cites to the
record, he fails to describe or analyze the portions of the record cited, or to demonstrate
that any bias, let alone obvious and prejudicial bias occurred. Defendant's reliance on the
two adverse pretrial rulings discussed in Points I and II of his brief is also unavailing. An
adverse ruling is an inadequate basis for a claim of judicial bias as a matter of law.
Defendant's claim of bias must therefore be rejected.

7

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
RULING THAT DEFENDANT FAILED TO SHOW THAT A STATEPAID ACCOUNTANT WAS NECESSARY FOR AN EFFECTIVE
DEFENSE
In Point I of his brief, defendant alleges that the trial court erroneously denied his
request for the assistance of a state-paid accountant in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §
77-32-302(1) (West 2004). Aplt Br. at 6. Section 77-32-302(1) provides that an indigent
defendant shall, upon request, "be provided with access to defense resources necessary
for an effective defense." Defendant's claim should be rejected, first, because it is
inadequately briefed, and second, because he has never shown that a state-paid accountant
was necessary to an effective defense.
A. Defendant's Claim is Inadequately Briefed.
Defendant challenges the trial court's refusal to appoint an accountant to assist in
the preparation of his defense. Aplt. Br. at 6. Although defendant attaches his copy of
the trial court's ruling, his argument is devoid of citation to the record below. His
analysis is also cursory. Defendant's failure to ground his claim of error in the record and
to provide meaningful analysis is grounds to reject his claim of error. See Utah R. App.
P. 24(a)(9), (i), (j). See also State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989) (declining
to review inadequately briefed claim).

8

B.

An Indigent Defendant is Entitled to State-Paid Expert
Assistance Where Necessary.

Even assuming defendant's claim of error is adequately briefed, defendant fails to
meet his burden under section 77-32-302(1) to show that a state-paid accountant was
"necessary for an effective defense."
The State agrees that an indigent defendant is entitled to necessary state-paid
expert assistance. SeeAke v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74, 83 (1985) (indigent defendant
constitutionally entitled to state-paid psychiatrist's assistance when his sanity at time of
offense is likely significant factor at trial); Little v. Armontrout, 835 F.2d 1240, 1243-44
(8th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (due process requires state to provide expert assistance to
indigent defendant who shows reasonable probability that expert would aid defense and
that denial of expert assistance would result in unfair trial); Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d
1021, 1026 (4th Cir. 1980) (equal protection requires state to provide expert witness to
indigent defendant who shows expert necessary to resolve substantial question); State v.
Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, ^[52, 979 P.2d 799 (recognizing that due process sometimes
requires that a defendant be allowed to have own expert examine critical evidence).
Likewise, section 77-32-302(l)(a), provides that an indigent defendant "shall... be
provided access to defense resources necessary for an effective defense, if. . . the
indigent requests . . . defense resources[.]" See also Utah R. Crim. Pro. 15(a) ("Upon
showing that a defendant is financially unable to pay the fees of an expert whose services

9

are necessary for adequate defense, the witness fee shall be paid as if he were called on
behalf of the prosecution").
Thus, to obtain state-paid expert assistance under the federal constitution, section
77-32-302(l)(a), or rule 15, a defendant must show not only that he is indigent, but also
that the expert assistance is necessary to an effective presentation of his defense. See
section 77-32-302(1 )(a) (requiring payment to indigent defendant only for "defense
resources necessary for an effective defense"). See also State v. Burns, 2000 UT 56, ^
32, 4 P.3d 795 (holding "that the only requirements for receiving public assistance for
expert witnesses are proof of necessity and establishment of indigence"); Bakalov, 1999
UT 45, f 52 (right to have own expert examine evidence arises only when that evidence is
"critical" in that it could induce a reasonable doubt); Utah R. Crim. Pro. 15(a) (providing
only for state-paid experts whose services are "necessary" and when defendant is
financially unable to pay).
The State does not dispute that defendant is indigent.1 Defendant, however, has
never shown a state-paid expert was "necessary for an effective defense" in this case.
Section 77-32-302(l)(a).

Neither the prosecutor nor the trial court questioned defendant's indigence. See,
e.g., R92-89;94; 101.
10

C.

Defendant Failed to Establish That a State-Paid
Accountant Was Necessary to an Effective Defense.

Before trial, defendant requested the services of a court-appointed accountant.
R88.2 Defendant alleged that the State's "payment summary regarding the child support
payments" at issue here contained an unspecified error. Id. Defendant reasoned that he
needed an "accountant to correctly determine, summarize, and give an amortization chart
of what has been paid and what[,] if any, needs to be paid." R87.
The prosecutor objected to defendant's request. R92-89. According to the
prosecutor, the payment summary or "Debt Computation" prepared by the ORS, and
admitted at the preliminary hearing on 20 October 2004, reflected "all payments
received" during the charged period. Id. at 92-91. Moreover, defendant was informed
"that any receipts which he had could be forwarded to the State, and that if verified, his
account would be credited." Id. Defendant, however, did not provide any receipts or
proof of payment for verification until a status hearing held six months later on 19 April
2005. Id. At that time, defendant presented "copies of certified checks made out to the
[ORS] for recent payments of child support." Those "payments were verified" and
credited to defendant's account. Id. Although defendant claimed to have "additional
proofs of payment that he would forward to the State," the prosecutor indicated that she
had received no other information regarding alleged payments from defendant. Id.

2

A copy of this and other pertinent pleadings, including the trial court's written
ruling, are attached in addendum A.
11

Accordingly, the prosecutor argued that a review of the ORS's "Debt Computation by an
accountant would serve no purpose as the Debt Computation merely reflected] what has
been entered in the ORS system." Id. The prosecutor reiterated that if defendant had
"additional proofs of payment for which he believe[d] he should receive credit," he could
still "forward them to the State for verification." Id. Because the prosecutor was willing
to credit defendant "for all verifiable child support payments," she opined that
"[defendant's concerns about the total child support arrearage may be able to be resolved
without cost." Id. The prosecutor thus asked the trial court to deny defendant's request
for a state-paid accountant, or, alternatively, to order defendant to "provide all alleged
proofs of payment to the State for verification to see if concerns over the child support
arrearage can be resolved without incurring additional costs." R90.
Defendant filed a written reply asserting that he had unspecified "theories that he
wishe[d] to present at trial," and that he needed a court-appointed accountant to "prepare
several amortization schedules that he [could] present to the jury." Rl 00-99. Defendant
further alleged that the payment summaries prepared by the ORS were "inaccurate," but
did not identify the alleged inaccuracies or amounts. R99.
The trial court denied defendant's request in a written ruling. R101. The trial
court found that defendant had failed to demonstrate "how an accountant would assist.. .
in his defense." Id. The trial court further found that "[t]he records of the State appear to
be kept on a computer with no back-up documents to review for accuracy other than the
[defendant's own records." Id. The trial court noted that the State had "agreed to give
12

the [djefendant credit for any payments he ha[d] made when he has proof of payment"
and ruled that "[tjhis record keeping does not require the skills of an accountant." Id.
(emphasis added).
As noted, section 77-32-302(1) provides that an indigent defendant "shall... be
provided with access to defense resources necessary for an effective defense, if. . . the
indigent requests . . . defense resources[.]" (Emphasis added). Here, an indigent
defendant requested a state-paid accountant to assist in the preparation of his defense, but
failed to explain why an accountant was "necessary for an effective defense." Id. For
example, defendant never specifically identified any alleged errors in the State's
calculation of his arrearages, nor did he identify any of the alleged defense "theories" that
he asserted required the assistance of a state-paid accountant. R88, 100-99. Rejecting
defendant's claim that he needed a state-paid accountant to prepare several amortization
schedules, the trial court agreed with the prosecutor that defendant had not shown that a
state-paid accountant was necessary to an effective defense. R101; see also R94.
On appeal, defendant shows no abuse of discretion in the trial court's ruling. Cf
State v. Hancock, 874 P.2d 132, 135 (Utah App. 1994) ("We will not reverse a trial
court's disposition of a motion for appointment of an investigator absent a showing that
the trial court abused its discretion"). Indeed, he does not even challenge the trial court's
findings that (1) he failed to demonstrate "how an accountant would assist" him "in his
defense," and that (2) the State was willing "to give [him] credit for any payments he has
made when he has proof," which "record keeping," the trial court noted, "[did] not
13

require the skills of an accountant." Id. at 101. Moreover, rather than attempt to
demonstrate prejudice, or to show a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result if he
had had a state-paid accountant, defendant merely speculates that "a rigorous examination
of the State's accounts could have meant the difference between a felony and a
misdemeanor," and that "[a] sufficient discrepancy in the accounts might have
undermined the State's credibility entirely." Aplt. Br. at 7 (emphasis added).
As the trial court's ruling emphasizes, however, the only evidence that could make
a difference in the amount of defendant's arrearages is additional evidence of payment
not already credited to defendant. See R101. Such evidence, if it existed, would have
been available to defendant whether he had a state-paid accountant or not. Certainly, it is
not the kind of evidence that could be uncovered only by an accountant scrutinizing the
ORS's computation of defendant's previously established payments. Rather, that task
could be just as easily be performed by a layperson. Nor is it the kind of evidence likely
to result from the preparation of alternative amortization schedules. See Rl 00-99. More
importantly, even assuming that defendant had produced additional proofs of payment
here, they would have been insufficient to reduce the felony charges to misdemeanors
unless they established that the total arrearage for either count did not exceed $10,000.
See section 76-7-20 l(3)(c) ("Criminal nonsupport is a felony of the third degree if the
actor: . . . commits the crime of nonsupport in each of 18 individual months within any
24-month period, or the total arrearage is in excess of $10,000"). The ORS here
calculated an arrearage of $21,718.03 owed to Maria Pincock for the period of October
14

1998 to July 2004, and an arrearage of $13,534.88 owed to Teresa Warden for the period
of August 1997 to July 2004. See Plaintiffs Exh. ## 1-2. In other words, defendant
would have had to produce additional proof of payments of more than $11,718.03 with
regard to count II, and of more than $3,534.88 with regard to count I, to reduce both
felony charges to misdemeanors. Defendant has never suggested that he possesses such
proof or that an accountant would have uncovered such discrepancies in the ORS records.
Finally, unlike the typical case in which a criminal defendant is afforded a statepaid expert, such as a psychiatrist or psychologist, the basic accounting issue here—the
amount of defendant's arrearages—is well within the ken of jurors. At bottom,
defendant's defense entailed little more than adding and subtracting what defendant owed
and what he had paid. Cf. Ake, 470 U.S. at 81 (observing that psychiatrists "ideally assist
lay jurors, who generally have no training in psychiatric matters, to make a sensible and
educated determination about the mental condition of the defendant at the time of the
offense"); Caldwell v. Mississippi, All U.S. 320, 323 n.l (1985) (no due process
violation occurred when state refused to appoint a nonpsychiatric expert where an
indigent Caldwell "offered little more than undeveloped assertions that the requested
assistance would be beneficial"). See also Little, 835 F.2d at 1244 (recognizing that 'Ake
and Caldwell taken together hold that a defendant must show more than a mere possibility
of assistance from an expert. Rather, the defendant must show a reasonable probability
that an expert would aid in his defense, and that denial of expert assistance would result
in an unfair trial."); Williams, 618 F.2d at 1026-27 (recognizing that indigent defendant
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should be afforded state-paid expert where "the subject matter is beyond the
comprehension of laymen").
In sum, defendant's undeveloped assertions of error and speculative claims of
prejudice are insufficient to show any abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of his
request for a state-paid accountant.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION
TO DENY DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SEVER TWO CHARGES
OF CRIMINAL NON-SUPPORT
In Point II of his brief, defendant asserts that he was unfairly prejudiced by the trial
court's refusal to sever two charges of criminal non-support. Aplt. Br. at 7. Defendant's
claim lacks merit.
A.

Joinder is proper if criminal charges are connected together in
their commission or alleged to have been part of a common
scheme or plan, and neither party is prejudiced.

The issue of whether a trial court must sever criminal charges is governed by
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 77-8a-l (West 2004), which provides:

(1) Two or more felonies, misdemeanors, or both, may be charged in the
same indictment or information if each offense is a separate count and if the
offenses charged are:
(a) based on the same conduct or are otherwise connected together in their
commission; or
(b) alleged to have been part of a common scheme or plan.

(4) (a) If the court finds a defendant or the prosecution is prejudiced by
joinder of offenses or defendants in an indictment or information or by a
16

joinder for trial together, the court shall order an election of separate trials
of separate counts, grant a severance of defendants, or provide other relief
as justice requires. .. .
In other words, different offenses are properly charged in a single information
when they are "connected together in their commission," or "alleged to be part of a
common scheme or plan," State v. Scales, 946 P.2d 377, 385 (Utah App. 1997), so long
as evidence of the crimes would be mutually admissible in a separate trials. See State v.
Mead, 2001 UT 58, \ 59, 27 P.3d 1115.
B.

The charges of criminal non-support were necessarily
connected together in their commission as the victims are
all defendant's children; moreover, the charges were also
alleged to have been part of defendant's scheme to avoid
paying any child support to his former wives*

Here, the trial court ruled that the charges of criminal non-support were connected
together in their commission. R186; see also section 77-8a-l(l)(b).3 The trial court also
found that the charges were connected together in their commission, given the substantial
overlap between the offenses. Rl86-85; see also section 77-8a-l(l)(a). Specifically, the
trial court found that
a relevant issue in both counts will be the income and expenses of the
[defendant during the applicable periods of time. Because the time periods
for each count overlap substantially, [defendant's] obligations and
payments to one former spouse would be admissible in establishing the
ability to pay his obligations to the other former spouse.

Copies of the ruling and other pertinent pleadings are attached in addendum B.
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Rl 85. Finally, the trial court ruled that defendant was not unfairly prejudiced by the
joinder of the criminal non-support charges because evidence of the two crimes would be
mutually admissible in separate trials. Id.; see also section 77-8a-l(4)(a). The trial court
specifically ruled that
evidence of one count would be admissible at a separate trial on the other
count for purposes of establishing motive, intent, absence of mistake, etc.
Therefore, the [djefendant. . . would not be prejudiced by joinder of the
various counts since evidence of each count would be admissible in a trial
on either count.
R185. The trial court ruled correctly.
First, the charges of criminal non-support were connected together because the two
periods of non-support overlapped by approximately six years, from October 1998 to
June 2004. See R426:254, 257-58; R425:511. As found by the trial court, given this
substantial overlap, "[defendant's] obligations and payments to one former spouse would
be admissible in establishing the ability to pay his obligations to the other former spouse."
R185. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-45-7.4, 78-45-7.6, 78-45-7.7 (West 2004) ("Uniform
Civil Liability for Support Act," setting forth child support guidelines and mandating that
"child support previously ordered," be taken into account in determining amount of
support obligation); see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.14 (West 2004) ("Base
combined child support obligation table and low income table"). See also Utah R. Evid.
404(b) (allowing "[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs[,] or acts" for non-character
purposes).
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Second, the State alleged that defendant committed both criminal non-support
offenses "with the common scheme or plan to pay little or no child support for any of his
children." R121. The trial evidence was not to the contrary. Defendant told Teresa that
she would "never see any money." R426:215. Similarly, defendant told Maria that if she
"didn't get [ORS] to quit garnishing his wages he would quit his job so they couldn't
garnish wages" and that he "spend[s] a hell of a lot of money making sure [she doesn't]
know how much money [he] [has]." Id. at 184. Thus, the criteria of section 77-8a-l(l)
are well established here.
Finally, as noted, these offenses are connected together in their commission
because the amount of one child support obligation affects the amount of the other; thus,
evidence of the non-support would be admissible in separate trials. See, e.g., sections 7845-7.4, 78-45-7.6, 78-45-7.7, & 78-45-7.14. Moreover, as found by the trial court, the
fact that defendant failed to make payments to both of his former wives during the same
six-year period is probative of defendant's disputed motive, intent and plan to avoid
making his child support payments, and of a lack of mistake. See, e.g., R425:393-447,
493-497. See also Utah R. Evid. 404(b) (recognizing prior crimes and bad acts are
admissible for non-character purposes); Mead, 2001 UT 58, f 59 (rejecting claim of
prejudice where "evidence of the other crime would have been admissible in a separate
trial") (additional quotation and citations omitted). Thus, evidence of defendant's
criminal non-support would be admissible in separate trials on the two criminal non-
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support charges here at issue. Id. Defendant therefore fails to demonstrate prejudice in
the joinder of the charges under section 77-8a-l(4)(a). See Mead, 2001 UT 585 f 59.
C.

Defendant's other claims of error are inadequately
briefed.

Notwithstanding the above, defendant disputes that the criminal non-support
offenses were in fact connected together in their commission because, although they were
committed during overlapping time periods, they involved "different victims." Aplt. Br. at
8. Defendant also disputes that the State showed a common scheme or plan because
criminal non-support is inherently a crime of "omission," but "[a] common scheme or
plan is in itself an act of commission." Aplt. Br. at 8 ("In fact, [defendant] was merely
charged with crimes of omission. A common scheme or plan is in itself an act of
commission."). Defendant cites no supporting authority and provides no meaningful
analysis of these claims. They may thus be rejected on the ground that they are
inadequately briefed. Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9); see also Wareham, 772 P.2d at 966
(declining to reach inadequately briefed claim).
D.

Defendant's other claims of error lack merit.

In any event, defendant's other claims should also be rejected because they lack
merit. Teresa and Maria may be different individuals or victims, but they share the
connection of being former wives of defendant, and their non-supported children—the
real victims in this case—are all indisputably connected together by the fact that
defendant is their father. These facts, together with the overlapping time frame for the
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criminal non-support offenses, are more than sufficient to establish a connection for
purposes of section 77-8a-l(l). As for defendant's contention that section 77-8a-l(l)(b)
contemplates only crimes of commission, it also lacks merit. Even assuming that
defendant's characterization of the statute is supportable, these are more than cases of
mere inaction or omission. As noted above, the trial evidence established that defendant
actively schemed or planned to avoid paying any of his child support obligations. See,
e.g.,R426:184,215.
The trial court's well-supported ruling denying defendant's severance motion
should be affirmed.
POINT III
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT REVIEW DEFENDANT'S CLAIM
THAT THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR IN NOT
SUA SPONTE RECUSING ITSELF FOR BIAS BECAUSE IT IS
INADEQUATELY BRIEFED
In Point III of his brief, defendant asserts that the "the trial judge had a bias against
[him]." Aplt. Br. at 10. According to defendant, it is "difficult to say with precision
exactly when the bias became apparent," thus, he acknowledges that he did not comply
with rule 29(c)(1), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which requires a party alleging bias
to move to disqualify the judge at issue within 20 days of discovering the alleged bias.4

specifically, the rule 29(c)(1)(A) provides that "[a] party to any action or the
party's attorney may file a motion to disqualify a judge." Rule 29(c)(l)(B)(iii) further
provides that "[t]he motion shall be filed after commencement of the action, but not later
than 20 days after . . . the date on which the moving party learns or with the exercise of
reasonable diligence should have learned of the grounds upon which the motion is based."
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Aplt. Br. at 10. Given his failure to preserve this issue, defendant asks this Court to reach
his claim of bias under the doctrine of plain error. Id. Defendant's claim of judicial bias,
let alone obvious and prejudicial judicial bias, is inadequately briefed and should be
rejected on that ground.
To establish plain error, defendant must show "that the trial court committed an
error that was both obvious and prejudicial." State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45, ^f 24, 122 P.3d
543. Defendant asserts that an alleged pattern of bias "emerges" in this case from the two
adverse pretrial rulings discussed in Points I and II of his brief, and from the record as a
whole. Aplt. Br. at 10 (citing R101, 188-84, andR425:5-12, 34-37, 39-41, 182-83, 213,
219, 262-63, 272,285, and R426:389, 449, 453). While defendant cites to the record, he
engages in no description of the parts of the record cited, let alone any analysis or
explanation of the alleged bias that occurred there, or why it was both obvious and
prejudicial. See Cruz, 2005 UT 45, \ 24. His claim of obvious and prejudicial judicial
bias is thus inadequately briefed. Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9); see also Wareham, 772 P.2d
at 966.
In any event, to the extent that defendant's allegation of bias is based on the trial
court's adverse pretrial rulings, his claim is frivolous on its face. As demonstrated in
Points I and II of the State's brief, the trial court's pretrial rulings are well-supported in
the record. Moreover, the fact that the adverse rulings were made pretrial, or outside the
jury's presence, undermines defendant's claim of bias. In State v. Alonzo, 973 P.2d 975,
979-80 (Utah 1998), the Utah Supreme Court affirmed this Court's holding that Alonzo
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failed to show prejudice based on the trial court's refusal to recuse itself where allegedly
biased statements were made before trial, in chambers, and outside the jury's presence.
Finally, an adverse ruling is an inadequate basis for a claim of judicial bias a matter of
law. See In re Affidavit of Bias, 947 P.2d 1152, 1154 (Utah 1997) (Zimmerman, C.J.,
sitting alone) (citing 46 Am.Jur.2d Judges § 219 (1994)). Defendant's allegation of
obvious and prejudicial bias is therefore frivolous on its face.
CONCLUSION
Defendant's jury convictions for felony criminal non-support should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY submitted on Jj_ September 2007.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General
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Addendum A

Addendum A

FILED
DISTRICT COURT
UINTAH COUNTY, UTAH

NAR 0 7 2006
JOANNE McKEE, CLERK

BY

ftft

DEPUTY

Bryan Sidwell (7625)
Attorney for Defendant
134 West Main, Suite 202
Vernal, Utah 84078
(435) 789-4900

IN AND FOR THE EIGHTH DISTRICTCOURT
UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

])
])

MOTION FOR FUNDS TO
HIRE ACCOUNTANT

v.

])

Case No. 041800326 FS

TREN SHELDON HORROCKS,
Defendant.

;)
]

Judge PAYNE

COMES NOW the defendant, by and through, his attorney Bryan Sidwell and requests an
Order granting the defendant funds to hire an accountant that can be called as an expert witness
at his trial. Grounds for such motion are set forth below.
1. The Defendant is indigent and has a court appointed attorney and is in need of funds.
2. The State of Utah has proved the defendant with discovery. As part of the discovery
that State of Utah has included a payment summary regarding the child support payments that the
defendant has paid to the victim.
3. The defendant believes that there has been an error with the payments as provided by
the State of Utah.
1

4. The defendant needs to hire an accountant to correctly determine, summarize and give
an amortization chart of what has been paid and what if any, needs to be paid.
DATED this ^ d a y of

ftwd--

, 2006.

Bryan Srowell
Attorney for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument was sent to the
following by hand delivery on March 7, 2006.
Ann Rozycki
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor
P.O. Box 140814
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0814
BryanJSidwell
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PILED
DISTRICT COURT
UINTAH COUNTY, UTAH

MAR 1 5 2008
JOANNE McKEE, CLERK
BY
dJj^
^DEPUTY

ANN ROZYCKL #7609
Assistant Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF #4666
ATTORNEY GENERAL
Attorneys for State of Utah
160 East 300 South
P.O. BOX 140814
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0814
Telephone: (801)366-0199

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF VERNAL
UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
v.
TREN SHELDON HORROCKS,
Defendant.

STATE'S RESPONSE TO MOTION
FOR FUNDS TO HIRE
ACCOUNTANT
Criminal No. 041800326FS
Judge: A. LYNN PAYNE

The State of Utah, through counsel, Ann Rozycki, Assistant Attorney General, files
this response to the DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR FUNDS TO HIRE ACCOUNTANT.
1. As part of Discovery in this case the State provided to Defendant in September 2004, a Debt
Computation which is a record of all payments received by the Office of Recovery Services.
Updated Debt Computations have been provided through out the proceedings.
2. The Debt Computation reflects all payments noted on the Office of Recovery Services
Information System.

fcl

y

3. At the Preliminary Hearing on October 20, 2004, the Defendant, through counsel, indicated that
he believed he had made child support payments through the Office of Recovery Services for which
he had not received credit. Defendant was informed by the Prosecutor and by Roberta Casados,
Criminal Specialist, Office of Recovery Services, that any receipts which he had could be forwarded
to the State, and that if verified, his account would be credited.
4. Defendant never provided receipts or proof of payment for verification.
5. At the Status hearing on April 19, 2005, the Defendant brought copies of certified checks made
out to the Office of Recovery Services for recent payments of child support. Those payments were
verified and the Defendant's account reflects credit for them.
6. At that hearing, the Defendant indicated that he had additional proofs of payment that he would
forward to the State. No information was forwarded.
7. A review of the Debt Computation by an accountant would serve no purpose as the Debt
Computation merely reflects what has been entered in the ORS system.
8. If the Defendant has additional proofs of payment for which he believes he should receive credit,
he may still forward them to the State for verification. If child support payments have been made
which have not yet been accounted for, he will receive credit.
9. Use of funds for an accountant may be unnecessary since the State has already informed the
Defendant that it will credit him for all verifiable child support payments. Defendant^ concerns
about the total child support arrearage may be able to be resolved without cost.
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WHEREFORE, the State respectfully request that:
1. The Defendant's Motion For Funds to Hire Accountant be denied,
OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE
2. That Defendant be required to provide all alleged proofs of payment to the State for verification
to see if concerns over the child support arrearage can be resolved without incurring additional costs.

Dated this '( ?

day of March, 2006.
/ /

£

- >01

^Aim Ro^ycki
Assistant Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion and Order on
State's Response to Motion For Funds to Hire Accountant, first class mail, postage prepaid, this

V ^ d a y of 1"\\,(JLAJK

2006, to:

Bryan Sidwell
Attorney at Law
134 West Main, Suite 202
Vernal, Utah 84078
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-OZPUTY

Bryan Sidwell (7625)
Attorney for Defendant
134 West Main, Suite 202
Vernal, Utah 84078
(435) 789-4900
IN AND FOR THE EIGHTH DISTRICTCOURT
UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

REPLY TO STATE'S
RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR
FUNDS TO HIRE
ACCOUNTANT

Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 041800326 FS

TREN SHELDON HORROCKS,
Defendant.

Judge PAYNE

COMES NOW the defendant, by and through, his attorney Bryan Sidwell and replies
to the State's response to motion for funds to hire accountant.
FACTS
1. The Defendant is indigent and has a court appointed attorney and is in need of funds.
2. The State of Utah has funds to hire full time employees, which have prepared payment
schedules and amortization charts for the State of Utah. These charts are prepared by State of
Utah employees in a way that is beneficial to the State of Utah's theory.
3. The Defendant is indigent and also has theories that he wishes to present at trial, but
1

has no money to hire a witness to prepare the documents. The defendant should be able to hire
someone that can be a witness at trial that will prepare an amortization schedule that is consistent
with his theory.
4. The defendant believes that the payment schedules prepared by the State of Utah are
inaccurate in several ways. The defendant wishes to have a person prepare several amortization
schedules that he can present to the jury.
Conclusion
If the defendant is not allowed funds to hire an accountant, then the defendant is being
denied due process by not being allowed to properly prepare a case for trial. The defendant
requests oral argument.
DATED this 1D day of

, 2006.

AUA<S>L

f ^ u ^ q ^ Aj-diMJ
BryanJSidwell
Attorney for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument was sent to the
following by hand delivery on March 27,2006.
Ann Rozycki
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor
P.O. Box 140814
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0814

6.

^H^^"— •

Bryan Sidwell
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ANN ROZYCKI #7609
Assistant Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF # 4666
ATTORNEY GENERAL
Attorneys for the plaintiff
160 East 300 South
P.O. Box 140814
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0814
Telephone: (801) 366-0199

FILED
DISTRICT COURT
JIN. AM COUNTY, ..-""AH

KAR 2 7 20C3
EY

JCK^NEJ^ei'EE CLERK
^O
DEPUTY"

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF VERNAL
UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
ORDER ON STATE'S RESPONSE TO
MOTION FOR FUNDS TO HIRE
ACCOUNTANT

Plaintiff,
v.
TREN SHELDON HORROCKS,

Criminal No. 041800326FS

Defendant.

Judge: A. LYNN PAYNE

Based upon the foregoing Motion and good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. Defendant's Motion For Funds to Hire Accountant is denied.
DATED this

H

day of

fk^u^

. 2006.

BY THE COURT:

A.LYNNPA1
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 0418 00326 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

NAME
ANN C ROZYCKI
ATTORNEY PLA
160 E 300 S 5TH FLR
P 0 BOX 140814
SALT LAKE CITY, UT
84114-0814

By Hand
Dated t h i s

AiV d a y

of

jyyMKAAJk

BRYAN D SIDWELL
,

2 0 n\o •

VWI U L L ,
DeputyyCourt Clerk
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

:

RULING

Plaintiff,

ulSTBIZT r<->. i —
^'TAHC06N7Y^AW

vs.

- W 3 ! ?;$[>

TREN SHELDON HORROCKS,

:

Defendant.

:

Case No.: 041800326

The Defendant's Request to Appoint an Accountant is denied. The request does not
demonstrate how an accountant would assist the Defendant in his defense. The records of the
State appear to be kept on a computer with no back-up documents to review for accuracy other
than the Defendant's own records. The State has agreed to give the Defendant credit for any
payments he has made when he has proof of payment. This record keeping does not require the
skills of an accountant.
DATED this

tV

da

V of March, 2006.
BY THE COURT:

A. LYNN PAYNH^ DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

MAILING CERTIFICATE
i St

I hereby certify that on the 31 ^ day of March, 2006, true and correct copies of the
Ruling were mailed, postage prepaid, or hand delivered to: Ms. Ann Rozycki, Assistant Attorney
General, at P.O. Box 140814, Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0814 and to Mr. Bryan Sidwell,
Attorney for Defendant, at 134 W. Main, Suite 202, Vernal, UT 84078.

\^kJ_
Deputy Cler]

Addendum B

Addendum B

FILED
DISTWCT"GOU&!
DIStWCT
^rfka
UWmHCOUHTf.UW1

APR2 7 2DI
C
SJKEE.CI£W |

DEPUTY

Bryan Sidwell (7625)
Attorney for Defendant

134 West Main, Suite 202
Vernal, Utah 84078
(435) 789-4900
IN AND FOR THE EIGHTH DISTRICTCOURT
UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

MOTION TO SEVER CHARGES

Plaintiff,
Case No. 041800326 FS
Judge PAYNE

TREN SHELDON HORROCKS,
Defendant.

COMES NOW the defendant, by and through, his attorney Bryan Sidwell and requests an
Order severing the charges and granting the defendant separate trials for the counts charged.
Grounds for such motion are set forth in the support memorandum.
DATED this 7L> day of

., 2006.

Bryan Sidwell
Attorney for Defendant

1

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument was sent to the
following by hand delivery on March 25,2006.
Ann Rozycki
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor
P.O. Box 140814
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0814
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FILED
DISTRICT COURT
UINTAH COUNTY, UTAH

Bryan Sidwell (7625)
Attorney for Defendant
134 West Main, Suite 202
Vernal, Utah 84078
(435) 789-4900
IN AND FOR THE EIGHTH DISTRICTCOURT
UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

)

V.

Plaintiff,

]
)

TREN SHELDON HORROCKS,
Defendant.

])
]

APR 2 7 20C6
JOANNE MeKEE, CLERK

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION TO SEVER
CHARGES

Case No. 041800326 FS
Judge PAYNE

COMES NOW the defendant, by and through, his attorney Bryan Sidwell and submits the
following memorandum in support of motion to sever charges.
FACTS
1. The defendant divorced Teresa Ann Warden on or about May 22,1990. The
defendant and Teresa Ann Warden had two children:
Jillyn E. Horrocks

born

Kelsey M. Horrocks born

May 4, 1987
September 1988

2. The State of Utah alleges in count I that the defendant has not provided for the above
mentioned children and that arrears are owed to Teresa Ann Warden.
3. After the defendant's divorce to Teresa Ann Warden he married Maria Pincock. They
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were divorced on or about September 27, 1994, subsequent to this divorce the defendant and
Maria Pincock remarried and were divorced again on or about May 11, 1988.
4. Two children were born as issue to the marriage between Maria Pincock and
defendant to wit: Ashley and Allie.
5. The State of Utah alleges in Count II that the defendant has not provided for the minor
children Ashley and Allie, children of Maria Pincock.
6. The alleged victims in count I and II are different.
RULE
(1) Two or more felonies, misdemeanors, or both, may be charged in the same indictment
or information if each offense is a separate count and if the offenses charged are:
(a) based on the same conduct or are otherwise connected together in their
commission; or
(b) alleged to have been part of a common scheme or plan. Utah Code of
Criminal Procedure Section 77-8a-l.
If the court finds one of the above then the court must look to see if joinder prejudices the
defendant.
(4) (a) If the court finds a defendant or the prosecution is prejudiced by a joinder of
offenses or defendants in an indictment or information or by a joinder for trial together, the court
shall order an election of separate trials of separate counts, grant a severance of defendants, or
provide other relief as justice requires.
The analysis is a two part test first is in permissible to join the counts under Utah Code of
Criminal Procedure section 77-8a-l and the second part does it prejudice the defendant. State v.
2

Scales, 946 P.2d 377 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
ANALYSIS
In the present case the two counts are not connected. There are separate victims
regarding each alleged count. Although, similar crimes are alleged in each count, the victims, the
timeframe,circumstances and facts surrounding each count is different.
There is no common scheme. Most crimes are crimes of commission. The person is
doing some type of prohibited conduct. In such crimes a person may use a common scheme to
commit the crimes. However, the alleged crimes in this case are different because they are
crimes of omission, meaning the defendant allegedly did not do something he should have or in
other words he failed to act. There is no common scheme in this matter.
Finally, the defendant would be prejudiced if the two counts are not severed. The alleged
allegation of not paying child support to one ex-wife prejudices the defendant case against the
other ex-wife and is not relevant.
CONCLUSION
Wherefore, the defendant requests that counts I and count II be severed and given
separate trials.
DATED this ZL day of __ & O A J ?

, 2006.

iflU^-

Bryaff Sidwell
Attorney for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument was sent to the
following by hand delivery on April 26,2006.
Ann Rozycki
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor
P.O. Box 140814
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0814
Bryan" Sidwell
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DEPUTY

R. Jason Hanks #9446
Assistant Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF #4666
ATTORNEY GENERAL
Attorneys for State of Utah
160 East 300 South
P.O. BOX 140814
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0814
Telephone: (801)366-0199
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF VERNAL
UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

STATE'S RESPONSE TO
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
SEVER CHARGES

v.
TREN SHELDON HORROCKS,

Criminal No. 041800326FS

Defendant.

Judge: A. LYNN PAYNE

The State of Utah, through counsel, R. Jason Hanks, Assistant Attorney General, files
this Response to the Defendant's Motion To Sever Charges and respectfully asks the Court to
Deny Defendant's Motion based on the following:
FACTS
1.

Count I of the State's Information alleges that the Defendant knowingly failed to support
his children, Jillyn and Eugenie, from August of 1997 through July of 2004.

2.

Count II of the State's Information alleges that the Defendant knowingly failed to support
his children, Ashlie and Allie, from October of 1998 through June of 2004.
ARGUMENT
The issue of whether a court must sever charges brought against defendant is governed by

Utah Code Ann. § 77-8a-l (1999) which in relevant part, states as follows:

(1) Two or more felonies, misdemeanors, or both, may be charged in the same
indictment or information if each offense is a separate count and if the offenses
charged are:
(a) based on the same conduct or are otherwise connected together in their
commission; or
(b) alleged to have been part of a common scheme or plan ....
(4) (a) If the court finds a defendant or the prosecution is prejudiced by a joinder
of offenses or defendants in an indictment or information or by a joinder for trial
together, the court shall order an election of separate trials of separate counts,
grant a severance of defendants, or provide other relief as justice requires.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-8a-l (1999).
Additionally, "The initial inquiry regarding whether a defendant is prejudiced by joinder
is whether evidence of the other crime would have been admissible in a separate trial." State v.
Meade, 27 P.3d 1115,1130 (Utah 2001) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting State v. Smith.
927 P.2d 649, 654).
In both Counts of Mr. Horrock's criminal case, it is alleged that the Defendant committed
the same conduct, failure to support his children. The Defendant's alleged actions in both Counts
are connected in their commission by overlapping charging periods. Count I (August of 1997
through July of 2004) and Count II (October of 1998 through June of 2004) allege time periods
2

of criminal non-support that run together for approximately six years. Since these charges cover
approximately the same time periods, it is the State's position that Defendant committed both
criminal Counts with the common scheme or plan to pay little or no child support for any of his
children. The fact that both alleged Counts occurred simultaneously goes to the Defendant's
motive, intent, plan, and proves lack of mistake in committing both crimes.
Additionally, the Defendant is not prejudiced by trying both Counts together. As stated
above, "prejudice" for the purpose of severing charges is shown by whether evidence of the other
crime would be admissible in a separate trial. S>ee State v. Meade, at 1130. In his Motion To
Sever Charges, the Defendant does not argue that any of the State's evidence would be
inadmissible in a separate proceeding and therefore the Defendant's prejudice argument fails.
It is the State's position that the evidence in both Counts is equally admissible in separate
proceedings. If the charges were severed and there were separate trials on each Count, the State
would call the exact same witnesses in both trials, and would be needlessly repeating the same
evidence. Both Counts should be tried together to promote judicial economy and to conserve
State resources.
CONCLUSION
Counts I and II of the State's Information allege the same conduct, failure of the
Defendant to support his children, during approximately the same time period, which are part of
the same common scheme or plan to deny his biological children support. There is no prejudice
to the Defendant in trying both Counts together.
3

WHEREFORE, the State respectfully requests that the Defendant's Motion be denied by
the Court.
Dated this

/

day of May, 2006.

R. Jason Hanks
Assistant Attorney General
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Attorney for Defendant
134 West Main, Suite 202
Vernal, Ut 84078
Telephone No.: (435) 789-4900
Fax. No.:
(435) 789-4999
IN THE EIGHTH DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
UINTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

vs.

;
;)
)
)
]

TREN SHELDON HORROCKS
Defendant.

)
;
])

REPLY TO STATE'S RESPONSE TO
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
SEVER CHARGES

Case No.: 041800326 FS
Judge: A. LYNN PAYNE

COMES NOW, the defendant, by and through counsel and replies to the State's response
to Defendant's motion to sever charges.
ARGUMENT
Point I
As stated in the defendant's memorandum to sever, there is no common scheme and
therefore, the counts cannot be joined. The term common scheme implies that the defendant
acted in such a way as to intentionally commit the alleged crime in count I and used the same
plan to commit the alleged crime in count II.. The term common scheme implies an action or a
crime of commission. There cannot be a common scheme when there is no action. The
defendant is allegedly charged with two counts, not because he acted, planned or schemed, but
because he failed to do an act.
1

Point II
The State of Utah erroneously states the opinion that the evidence in Count I is admissible
with regard to count II.
Whether the defendant paid child support to one ex-wife is irrelevant to whether he paid
child support to a second ex-wife. In the event it is relevant it should be excluded on the grounds
of prejudice, confusion or waste of time.
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 403 states, "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence."
The only purpose of using evidence from count I and count 11 is to confuse the jury and
incite the jury in a negative way toward the defendant.
Point III
Finally, the State of Utah argues that trying the two counts together promotes judicial
economy and conserves State resources. This matter is already set for a two day trial. The trial
date was set in this manner so that it would either be one two-day trial or two one-day trials.
Based on the way the trial date was scheduled there is little or no savings to the State by having
one trial. Further any savings is not outweighed to the damage to the defendant.
DATED May 09, 2006.

Bryan ^idwell
Brya
Attorney for Defendant
2

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
The undersigned hereby certifies that on May 09, 2006, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing OBJECTION TO DISCOVERY was deposited in the United States mail, postage
prepaid, addressed to:

R. Jason Hanks
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor
P.O. Box 140814
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0814

Bryan^idwell
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
RULING
Plaintiff,
vs.
TREN SHELDON HORROCKS,

CASE NO. 041800326
JUDGE A. LYNN PAYNE

Defendant.

This matter is before the Court on the Defendant's "Motion
to Sever Charges," filed with the Court on April 27, 2006, and
accompanied by supporting memorandum. The State's response to
the Defendant's motion was filed on May 02, 2006. The Court,
having reviewed the motion, now enters the following ruling on
the motion.
This case involves two third-degree felony charges against
the Defendant for failure to support his children from two separate marriages. "A court should sever charges when it concludes
that prejudice to the defendant outweighs considerations of
economy and practicalities of judicial administration, with
doubts being resolved in favor of severance." State v. Smith,,
927 P.2d 649, 653 (Utah App. 1996).
Count One alleges that the Defendant knowingly failed to
support his children, Jillyn and Kelsey, from August 1997
through July 2004. Count Two alleges that the Defendant knowingly failed to support his children, Ashley and Allie, from October 1998 through July 2004. The two sets of the Defendant's
children result from different marriages. The Defendant has
filed a motion to sever the charges, arguing that in the present
case the two counts are not connected in that there are separate

DEPUTY

victims from each alleged count. The Defendant also argues that
there is no common scheme between the alleged counts. The State
argues that "since these charges cover approximately the same
time periods, it is the State's position that Defendant committed both criminal counts with the common scheme or plan to pay
little or no child support for any of his children." State's
Response, pg.3.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-8a-l (2006) governs this this area of
law. State v. Germonto, 868 P.2d 50, 60 n.8 (Utah 1993). The
relevant section of the Utah Code states:
Two or more felonies, misdemeanors, or both, may be charged
in the same indictment or information if each offense is a
separate count and if the offenses charged are: (a) based
on the same conduct or are otherwise connected together in
their commission; or (b) alleged to have been part of a
common scheme or plan.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-8a-l(l) (2006). In this case, each of the
offenses brought against the Defendant are separate counts, alleged to be part of a common scheme or plan (to avoid paying
child support for his children). In State v. Lee, 831 P.2d 114
(Utah App. 1992), the Utah Court of Appeals addressed what was
required in order to establish a "common scheme or plan" under
this statute.
The Lee court first identified that Utah appellate courts
had not yet interpreted that language under this statute. Lee.,
831 P.2d at 117. Rather, the Utah appellate courts have looked
to neighboring states for their interpretations. The Arizona
Supreme Court, in interpreting a rule similar to section 77-8a1, held that: "in order for two crimes to be classified as a
common plan or scheme it is not necessary for the crimes to have
been perpetrated in an absolutely identical manner, so long as
the court perceives a visual connection between the two crimes."
State v. Tipton, 119 Ariz. 386, 581 P.2d 231 (Ariz. 1978). The
Lee court also cited cases from Idaho and Missouri, both of
which allowed joinder of two or more claims where both counts in
the indictment referred to the same type of offense, even where
the time periods for commission of the separate offenses were
months apart. See State v. Warren, 717 S.W.2d 231 (Mo. App.

1986); see also State v. Schwartzmiller, 685 P.2d 830 (Idaho
1984). In Lee, the Utah Court of Appeals upheld the trial
court's conclusion that the alleged crimes were part of a "common scheme or plan." The Lee court stated, "The parallel fact
pattern in both incidents plainly demonstrates the existence of
a calculated plan.
Later, in State v. Scales, 946 P.2d 377 (Utah App. 1997),
the Utah Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's decision to
deny a defendant's motion to sever charges. The defendant had
been charged with murder and theft. The Scales court stated
that "to determine whether the trial court complied with section
77-8a-l, we must interpret it according to the common meaning of
its plain language." Scales, 946 P.2d at 384-85. The court
then indicated that "the language of section 77-8a-l is clear."
Id. The Scales court was convinced that the murder and theft
charges were part of a common scheme or plan, the thefts facilitating flight from the murder scene.
Therefore, under the plain language of the statute and supporting case law, the statutory requirements for joinder of the
charges appear to have been met. However, the same statute continues by stating:
If the court finds a defendant or the prosecution is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or defendants in an indictment or information or by a joinder for trial together, the
court shall order an election of separate trials of separate counts, grant a severance of defendants, or provide
other relief as justice requires.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-8a-l (4) (a) (2006). This section requires
the Court to determine whether the parties (either the State or
the Defendant) would be prejudiced by joinder of the offenses,
and if prejudice results, the court is to take appropriate action. "The initial inquiry regarding whether a defendant is
prejudiced by joinder is whether evidence of the other crime
would have been admissible in a separate trial." State v. Mead,
2001 UT 58, 159 (internal quotations omitted). In Lee., the Utah
Court of Appeals, in addressing this very question, stated that

in order to determine whether evidence of one [count] would
be admissible at a separate trial on the other count, we
look to Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. That
rule provides: 'Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts
is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident.'
In the case before the Court, evidence of one count would be admissible at a separate trial on the other count for purposes of
establishing motive, intent, absence of mistake, etc. Therefore, the Defendant in this case would not be prejudiced by
joinder of the various counts since evidence of each count would
be admissible in a trial on either count.
Finally, a relevant issue in both counts will be the income
and expenses of the Defendant during the applicable periods of
time. Because the time periods for each count overlap substantially, Mr. Horrock's obligations and payments to one former
spouse would be admissible in establishing the ability to pay
his obligations to the other former spouse.
The requirements for joinder are met and there does not appear to be prejudice to the Defendant. For these reasons, the
Court hereby denies the Defendant's motion to sever.
Dated this

day of

fYl<Z~\s

, 2006,

BY THE COURT:

Ufa

A. LYNN PAYNE, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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